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Tinkering with the Student Speech Test: A Much Needed Update to the First Amendment
Quandary for the Cyberbullying Epidemic
I. INTRODUCTION: “SHE DESERVED TO KILL HERSELF…”
The two minute, five second video, perhaps considered quaint at its actual date of
filming, is today, instantly and eerily recognizable. The YouTube embodiment, which has been
taken down and reposted numerous times, boasts a monstrous amount of hits, well past the
million mark.1 In a single camera shot, Jamey Rodemeyer’s big brown eyes lock focus with his
computer camera.2 His shiny braces reflect off the screen and his dresser mirror behind him as
he painfully, yet frequently, smiles through his video-narrative. The Buffalo native had
proclaimed himself as openly gay before he reached his teen years3 and was participating in an
online video project called “It Gets Better”4 when he posted the aforementioned video-diary
about his experiences.5 His peers responded negatively to the declaration and students posted
messages of hate on his Facebook wall,6 Twitter account, and blog.7

1

Jamey Rodemeyer, It Gets Better, I promise!, YOUTUBE (May 4, 2011), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Pb1CaGMdWk. Jamey’s YouTube “channel” and profile contains other videos he posted regarding his experiences
with bullying and is still operated by his sister. See Jamey Rodemeyer, And This is Jamey’s HAUS (xgothemo99xx’s
Channel), YOUTUBE (Last updated Oct., 2011), http://www.youtube.com/user/xgothemo99xx.
2
Id.
3
Carolyn Thompson, Jamey Rodemeyer’s Suicide Leads to Bullying Spotlight, Caution, THE HUFFINGTON POST,
Sept., 28, 2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/09/29/jamey-rodemeyers-suicide-_n_987054.html.
4
See Dan Savage, What is the It Gets Better Project, http://www.itgetsbetter.org/pages/about-it-gets-better-project/
(last visited Dec. 30, 2011). The project, created by journalist Dan Savage and his partner Terry Miller, encourages
individuals to personally reach out in support of LBGT youth by posting user-made YouTube Videos and was
initially created in response to many young people taking their lives after being bullied by fellow students. Id.
5
Thompson, supra note 3.
6
See Interview by Anderson Cooper with Alyssa, Tracy, and Timothy Rodemeyer, Sister, Mother, and Father of
cyberbullied suicide victim Jamey Rodemeyer, in D.C. (Oct. 3, 2011) (available
http://www.andersoncooper.com/2011/10/02/jamey-rodemeyer-family-speaks-out-about-bullying/). Students
responded with comments such as, “Jamey is stupid, fat and ugly. He must die. I wouldn’t care if you died. :) No
one would – just do it. It would make everyone way more happier.” Id.
7
Thompson, supra note 3.

In September 2011, 14-year-old Jamey hung himself outside his parents’ home.8 Jamey’s
14-year old sister discovered his body on the family swing set, “the same swing set that he was
on since he was three years old. That we built special for them,” Jamey’s mother later reported.9
At a school dance the day of his wake, while Jamey’s friends huddled in groups consoling each
other, a Lady Gaga song was played to honor the teen.10 Other students present, however, yelled
they were glad Jamey was dead, simultaneously taunting his younger sister who was present.11
While deaths like Jamey’s send shockwaves through communities, they are becoming
horrifyingly more common. In 2009, there was the story of Phoebe Prince, a young girl who
transferred to South Hadley High School in Massachusetts from Ireland and as a freshman began
dating a senior football player.12 In response, a group of girls began bullying her online, calling
her “whore” and “Irish slut” through the social networking media of Facebook, Twitter,
Craigslist and Formspring.13 School officials claimed they could not discipline any of the
student bullies and the online harassment quickly gave way to face-to-face bullying.14 On
January 14th, 2010, Phoebe hung herself in the stairwell of her home.15
Typing any combination of the terms “cyberbullying” and “suicide” into Google reveals a
familiar pattern: students bully a fellow peer via the Internet, school officials are unaware or
8

Id.
Interview with the Rodeymeyer family, supra note 6.
10
Thompson, supra note 3.
11
Id. Another interesting follow-up question which is increasingly becoming ripe for examination and being
highlighted by the media, is whether or not it is within the school districts discretion to punish speech which occurs
even after a victim has passed. Arguably it is, as it has great chance of not only be materially disruptive to learning,
but also could be construed as cyberbullying towards surviving family members, thereby creating “new” victims.
12
Helen Kennedy, Phoebe Prince, South Hadley High School’s ‘New Girl,’ Driven to Suicide by Teenage Cyber
Bullies, DAILY NEWS, Mar. 29, 2010, http://articles.nydailynews.com/2010-03-29/news/27060348_1_facebooktown-hall-meetings-school-library. Phoebe’s tormentors now face criminal charges for their actions and her case
has prompted change to Massachusetts’s state laws. Id.
13
Id. “Formspring” is a social-networking/media site that can be linked to Facebook accounts and is a selfdescribed way to “[f]ind out more about your friends by asking and responding to interesting questions.”
FORMSPRING, http://www.formspring.me/ (last visited Jan. 3, 2012).
14
Kennedy, supra note 12.
15
Id. After her death, Phoebe’s cyber-tormentors continued to post messages of hate on her Facebook wall. Id.
9
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powerless, and the teen is eventually driven to suicide. The search results are chilling, listing the
names and stories of young, dead individuals, in a haunting cyber-eulogy. Alexis Pilkington—
June 17, 1992-March 21, 2010.16 Like Phoebe and Jamey,17 bullies continued to post messages
of hate on Alexis’s memorial page after the teen took her own life, with one anonymous
comment reading, “She was obviously a stupid depressed [expletive] who deserved to kill
herself. she [sic] got what she wanted. be [sic] happy for her death. rejoice [sic] in it.”18
Some of the following names may be vaguely familiar to you—maybe you heard them
on a news clip or saw them in a recent paper. Perhaps you are aware of them because they hit
closer to home; maybe you knew someone who knew someone who knew them. But regardless
of how you know their names, the fact remains that each name belongs to a victim. “Victim” is a
negative term, albeit one with legal significance, yet it is one that conceals a person, an
individual, beneath its harsh exterior. In most cases this person—this human being, suffered a
dramatic loss as a result of words that were directed at them through a screen, while the author
cowardly hid in the refuge provided by the anonymous space.19 The number of “victims” is
growing20 and will continue to grow if nothing is changed regarding the way the legal system—
16

Edecio Martinez, Alexis Pilkington Brutally Cyber Bullied, even After her Suicide, CBS NEWS, Mar. 26, 2010,
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-504083_162-20001181-504083.html. The seventeen-year-old Alexis, who had
already received a soccer scholarship to attend college, took her life in her Long Island home as a result of continued
online harassment. Id. Pilkington’s parents initially claimed that their daughter had been depressed before the
online bullying began, but later admitted that their daughter’s death was most likely the ultimate result of the
ongoing harassment and threats. Id.
17
See Thompson supra note 3 and text accompanying; see also Kennedy supra note 12; see also supra note 11 and
text accompanying.
18
Martinez, supra note 17. Finally, there was Ryan Halligan—who was only an 8th grader. See Interview by PBS
Frontline with John Halligan, victim’s father, found at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/kidsonline/interviews/halligan.html, (Oct. 19, 2007). After being
repeatedly harassed for his learning disabilities, frequently taunted as being homosexual, and made to believe that a
girl from his class liked him, the Vermont boy took his own life in 2003. Id.
19
See Daniel infra note 89 at 623.
20
See Amanda Lenhart, Marry Madden, Aaron Smith, Kristen Purcell, Kathryn Zickuhr, Lee Rainie, Teens,
Kindness and Cruelty on Social Network Sites, PEW RESEARCH CENTER, FOSI, Nov. 9, 2011,
http://www.pewinternet.org/Reports/2011/Teens-and-social-media/Summary.aspx. The study reports that of the
95% of social media-using teens who have witnessed cruel behavior on social networking sites, 66% have also
reported they witnessed others joining the bullying and 21% admitted they joined the harassment as well. Id.

3

both the construction afforded by judicial tests and the legislature currently on the books—
conceptualizes cyberbullying.21 The main problem in implementing this “change” however is
that school districts frequently claim they are unable to punish students for off-campus internet
speech, for fear of infringing on students’ First Amendment freedom of speech rights.22 Where
the line should be drawn as to both remedial and preventative action by school districts depends
on a redefining of the jurisprudence surrounding student Internet speech. In sum, the discretion
that the law affords school administrative procedures in dealing with discipline must ultimately
be broadened.
It is the off-campus Internet speech, activity, and bullying that remains a question and an
area of heavy debate within the federal circuits.23 On June 13, 2011 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit, filed opinions for both Layshock v. Hermitage School District and
J.S. v. Blue Mountain School District, two factually similar cases involving cyberbullying and
student-protected Internet speech. 24 In each of these much anticipated decisions, the Third
Circuit held that the student-created offensive and derogatory profiles posted on MySpace from
home computers, 25 were in fact protected by the First Amendment and the respective school

21

See Daniel, infra note 89 at 626–627.
Id. at 641. Daniel describes students as hiding behind the “First amendment shield,” where the law, in some
aspects, is unable to reach them. Id. See e.g. Emmitt v. Kent Sch. Dist. No. 415, 92 F.Supp.2d 1088, (W.D. Wash.
2000); Beussink v. Woodland R–IV Sch. Dist., 30 F.Supp.2d 1175, (E.D. Mo. 1998); but see J.S. ex real v.
Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 757 A.2d 412, (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000).
23
See Daniel, infra note 52 at 626. The author continues by noting that, “This First Amendment protection,
originally invoked by students wishing to express their political views in Tinker, has unfortunately been
overemphasized by federal district courts, whose opinions have in turn taught school personnel to be wary of
disciplining potential bullies.” Id.
24
Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 249, (3d Cir. 2010), vacated, rehearing en banc, 650 F.3d 205 (3d Cir.
2011) (Jordan, K., concurring), aff’g 496 F.Supp. 2d 587 (W.D. Pa. 2007); J.S. v. Blue Mt. Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915,
(3rd Cir. 2011).
25
See Layshock, 650 F.3d at 210 (the parody profile portrayed the principal as often getting drunk, doing steroids,
smoking “big blunt[s],” and shoplifting from Kmart); see J.S., 650 F.3d at 918 (the female principal’s fake profile
listed her interests as hitting on students, spending time with her unattractive child, and engaging in sexually deviant
acts).
22

4

districts had erred in punishing the students for the off-campus speech.26 These holdings, which
produced a split between the Third Circuit and cases already decided by the Second Circuit,27 are
extremely problematic, providing none of the much needed guidance for students, administrators,
or teachers with regard to the growing problem of cyberbullying.28 Before the Court’s June 13th
holding, scholars and critics alike predicted that the decision would produce a definitive answer
as to whether or not school districts could punish off-campus speech in general.29 Unfortunately,
that the Third Circuit’s en banc ruling did not provide the much-needed guidance regarding
student speech.30
Such ambiguities remain and will continue to remain: on January 17, 2012, the Supreme
Court denied certiorari31 in both Layshock and J.S.’ cases, as well as another speech case,
Kowalski v. Berkeley County Schools involving a student suspended for abusing a classmate in a
2005 off-campus-created website, which she then sent to fellow students urging them to
comment.32 Given the broad range of federal court opinions on the subject, many, including the
Pennsylvania ACLU attorneys involved in the case, had hoped the Supreme Court would decide
the question relating to student Internet speech and cyberbullying sooner rather than later.33
While the court gave no reason for its decision to resolve the conflict, Francisco Negron Jr.,

26

Layshock, 650 F.3d at 207; J.S., 650 F.3d at 920.
See e.g. Doniger v. Niehoff, 2011 WL 1532289, (2d Cir. 2011) (affirming on appeal that the school district had
not erred an there was no first amendment violation when a student was punished for off-campus online speech
because she intended the blog eventually be viewed on campus).
28
See Thomas Wheeler, Facebook Fatalities: Students, Social Networking and the First Amendment, 31 PACE L.
REV. 182, 227 (2011). Many commentators exhibited the impression that the courts rulings in Layshock and J.S.
would end the uncertainty surrounding this problem. Id.
29
See id.
30
See supra note 28.
31
Blue Mountain Sch. Dist. v. J.S. ex rel. Snyder, 11-502, 2012 WL 117558, *1 (U.S. Jan. 17, 2012) (denying also
the Layshock’s case and Kowalski’s 4th Circuit Case).
32
652 F.3d 565, (4th Cir. 2011)(holding the school district did not violate the student’s free speech rights in
suspending her nor did they violate her due process rights for issuing her suspension without a hearing, for posting
the website).
33
Maryclaire Dale, Online Student Speech Appeals Rejected by Supreme Court, HUFFINGTON POST, Jan. 17, 2012,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/01/17/court-rejects-appeals-in-_0_n_1210399.html.
27

5

general counsel for the National School Board Association, urged the court to reconsider an offcampus Internet speech case as soon as possible.34 Negron argued that because “technology
blurs the lines between on-campus and off-campus speech, school districts need clear guidance
to be able to effectively address extreme off-campus speech that interferes with a safe and
orderly learning environment.”35
II. BACKGROUND: THE SAME THING OVER AND OVER AGAIN
A. The Court’s Authority to Control and Ability to Protect
In determining whether students can be disciplined for off-campus conduct involving the
use of the internet, courts first need to ascertain whether the social networking or cyber posts in
question are, in fact, protected speech. In doing so, the judiciary turns to a line of Supreme Court
cases dealing with student speech in general. As with speech that appears in more traditional
educational contexts, an important factor the courts examine is whether Internet postings caused,
or had a reasonable potential to cause, a substantial disruption in schools.36
The 1969 Supreme Court holding in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community
School District initiated the concept that a student has a right to express him or herself, while at
school, so long as the speech does not interfere with the rights of others or the school’s
disciplinary system.37 Only when a student’s conduct, whether in class or out, “materially
disrupts” the classwork or involves a substantial disorder amounting to an invasion of the rights
of others, is the speech not afforded any Constitutional protection.38 Tinker thus set the standard
by which all courts begin an analysis in determining whether students can be disciplined for
34

See Bill Mears, High Court Rejects Appeals on Public Prayers, Student Speech, CNN U.S., Jan. 17, 2012,
available at http://articles.cnn.com/2012-01-17/us/us_scotus-appeals_1_appeals-court-student-speech-highcourt/2?_s=PM:US.
35
Id.
36
See Ronald D. Wenkart, Disruptive Student Speech and the First Amendment: How Disruptive Does it Have to
Be?, 236 Educ. L. Rep. 551 (2008). Wenkart provides a discussion of related issues.
37
393 U.S. at 512–513.
38
Id.
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expressions either on or off campus. Decided during the political turmoil of the 1960s and the
Vietnam War, the Court invalidated the policy of a school board in Iowa prohibiting studetns
from wearing black armbands in school to protest the war.39 Stating that “it could hardly be
argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or
expression at the schoolhouse gate,” the Tinker Court attempted to balance the rights of students
against the previously recognized needs of educators to preserve discipline and order in
schools40. The Supreme Court viewed the dispute as one “involve[ing] direct, primary First
Amendment rights akin to ‘pure speech,’”41 rather than one “concern[ing] speech or action that
intrudes upon the work of the schools or the rights of other students.”42
Thus, in order to prohibit the students from expressing particular points of view, the
Court was convinced that the school officials must be able to show that their actions were
motivated by something more than a bald desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that
always accompany an unpopular view.43 Where there is no finding and no showing that
engaging in the forbidden conduct would “materially and substantially interfere with the
requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school,” the prohibition cannot be
sustained.44 Moreover, the Court proclaimed that disciplining students for expression violates
the First Amendment unless school authorities can show either a material or substantial
disruption occurred or that the potential for disruption was reasonably foreseeable.45
About Seventeen years after Tinker, the Supreme Court examined the limits of student
expression in Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, a dispute in Washington state involving a
39

Id.
Id. at 506.
41
Id. at 508.
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
Tinker, 393 U.S. 503 at 509 (citing Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)).
45
Id.
40

7

student who delivered a vulgar speech at a school assembly prior to student body elections.46
While the speech did not contain any explicit profanity, it consisted of elaborate, graphic, and
explicit sexual metaphors.47 The speech caused s substantial disruption, as some students in the
audience cheered while others exhibited embarrassed behaviors.48 The student had ignored
warnings from two educators not to deliver the speech and was suspended for three days for
violating the school’s rule prohibiting obscene and profane language.49
The Supreme Court, reversing the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in favor of the student, held that
school officials are not prohibited from disciplining students for offensively lewd or indecent
speech under the First Amendment.50 The Court continued by reasoning that school
administrators were justified in disciplining the student for violating school rules because he
delivered the speech after being advised against doing so.51 The Court distinguished the speech
in Fraser from that in Tinker, where the students wearing of armbands were a passive, nondisruptive expression of a political position, rather than an obscene speech incident to a student
election, lacking a real political viewpoint and delivered to an unsuspecting captive audience.52
Recognizing the duty of school personnel to control students habits and instill manners of
civility, the Court insisted that “the determination of what manner of speech in the classroom or
in school assembly is inappropriate properly rests with the school board.”53
Additionally, in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, the Supreme Court addressed
an issue concerning school officials’ control over school-sponsored publications.54 In Kuhlmier

46

478 U.S. 675, 678 (1986).
Id.
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Id. at 685.
51
Id.
52
Fraser, 478 U.S. at 684.
53
Id. at 683.
54
795 F.2d 1368 (8th Cir. 1986), rev’d, 484 U.S. 260 (1988), remanded to 840 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1988).
47
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a Missouri high school principal deleted two articles from a newspaper written and edited by
students in a journalism class; on article was about teen pregnancy while the other dealt with a
student’s parents’ divorce.55 The Eighth Circuit had held that the student newspaper was a
public forum for First Amendment purposes and the school officials were not justified in
censoring the articles.56
The Court distinguished Tinker from Kuhlmeier by stating that the issue was not as much
the right of students to speak as it was the duty of school personnel to not promote particular
student speech.57 The Court recognized the authority of school administrators over schoolsponsored publications and student activities that could reasonably be perceived to bear a
school’s “imprimatur.”58 Ultimately, the Court was satisfied that the First Amendment is not
violated when school personnel exercise editorial control over the substance of school-sponsored
publications if their actions are reasonably related to achieving valid educational objectives.59
The Kuhlmeier Court added that narrowly tailored, content-neutral regulations as to time,
place, and manner of expression can be enforced but only if the governmental interest in
question is significant and alternative channels of communication are open.60 The Court, in
conceding that the public school a setting is a special context for First Amendment purposes,
articulated that school personnel do not need to allow student speech that is inconsistent with the
school’s basic educational mission when the speech is sponsored by the school or is part of its

55

Id.
Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 274.
57
Id. at 271.
58
Id. at 281.
59
Id. at 260. In its analysis the Court reviewed different categories that it felt delineated free speech. The
governmental power to regulate expression is most restricted on public property such as parks, streets, and
sidewalks. According to the Court, the government may prohibit speakers from traditional public forums only when
it is necessary to serve compelling state interests and only when doing so by the least restrictive means possible. Id.
at 267.
60
Id. at 267.
56

9

curriculum.61 Finally, the Court made a distinction between the assembly forum in Fraser and
situations where school facilities and media are open for use by the general public, including
student organizations.62
Similarly, the Supreme Court definitively held in Morse v. Frederick that more traditional
off-campus speech can be regulated when a student is off-campus on a public sidewalk, if the
student is under the authority of the school at the time and is part of a school sanctioned event.63
Morse arose when a student, during an Olympic torch relay through Alaska, waived a banner
with the words “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS,” printed on it and was later suspended.64 When the
student challenged his suspension, the federal court in Alaska granted the school board’s motion
for summary judgment, but the Ninth Circuit reversed in the student’s favor.65 The Supreme
Court, on appeal, reversed the decision and rejected the student’s claim that he was not engaged
in school speech, noting that the event was sufficiently associated with the school.66
The Court first noted that “there is some uncertainty at the outer boundaries as to when
courts should apply school-speech precedents.”67 The Court also observed that students’ free
speech rights must be viewed in light of the “special characteristics” existing in a school
environment.68 Second, the Court ruled that Tinker is neither absolute nor the only basis on
which student speech can be restricted.69 Noting that the Court’s own Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence understood the important, and perhaps even compelling, interest of educators to
deter student drug use, the Court agreed that the principal acted properly in disciplining the
61

Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 266.
Id. at 267.
63
551 U.S. 393 (2007).
64
Id. at 408.
65
Id.
66
Id. In finding that the principal’s interpretation that students could perceive the banner as promoting illegal drug
use to be reasonable, the Court relied on Tinker, Fraser, and Kuhlmeier in conducting the two-part analysis.
67
Id.
68
Morse, 551 U.S. at 408.
69
Id. at 405.
62
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student who displayed the banner.70 The Court, however, did reject the school board’s argument
that the principal could have banned the sign under Fraser’s “plainly offensive” standard,
reasoning that doing so would grant school officials too much authority.71
This comment will mainly address the question of whether secondary school
administration should be able to punish student’s vulgar speech or speech which is construed as
cyberbullying through social media websites such as Facebook, Twitter, and their antecedents,72
when it is done off-campus and potentially from a home computer or device that is not connected
through a district server. It is well settled that on-campus speech, (e.g. on school grounds or
through a campus server) would fit into the traditional frame of the meaning of “within” the
schoolhouse gate and would thus be punished like any other disruptive offense that occurs on
school grounds.73 The Court, instead held that the principal acted out of the school’s legitimate
concern of preventing the student from promoting illegal drug use.74
The main argument of this comment is that secondary school officials should be
permitted to punish student Internet speech, even when it occurs off-campus. School officials
should be afforded this judgment without fearing a First Amendment action brought on behalf of
the student,75 when (1) the speech in question is reasonably related to the school in some way76
and (2) when there is a likelihood that a “material disruption” will occur or has already occurred,
70

Id. at 407, 409-10.
Id. at 408.
72
Many of the cases discussed at length/or which have dealt with this issue before are actually cases where the
student speech in controversy or sought to be regulated were posted to MySpace, which had more of a rise in
popularity in the late 1990s to early 2000s rather than the currently more popular Facebook or Twitter. See Ben
Bajin, Could what Happened to MySpace Happen to Facebook?, TIME, Jul. 15, 2011,
http://techland.time.com/2011/07/15/could-what-happened-to-myspace-happen-to-facebook/ (the author argues that
MySpace failed to innovate and serve its changing population and now is an outmoded form of social networking).
73
See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505 (1969). Accordingly, school districts have
the authority to mete out punishment when the cyberbullying occurs physically “on-campus” or through on-campus
servers.
74
Id. at 410.
75
Id. at 627.
76
The speech can be construed as being reasonably related if it is about another student, a teacher, the school itself
or the administration.
71
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under a good faith objective standard.77 Allowing school officials to decide whether or not a
“material disruption” has occurred, further capitalizes on the discretion, judgment and experience
of the school administration. While it is true that the view advocated for in the past, detailing a
more cognizable solution is to educate student’s on responsible technology and restrict speech
less,78 the growing statistics representing cyberbullied youth clearly indicates a need for stronger
regulation.79
In defining a material disruption, the Court must look at a variety of factors mostly
relating to the character of the disruption, but should not be forced to wait until actual harm
affects other students, the school, or teachers. In assessing and reformatting how the speech
surmounts the “schoolhouse gate” and can be punishable even when originating off-campus, the
Tinker test must be re-formatted to be applicable in a changing technological era.80 Finally, if
the action then progresses, the Court should balance the student’s free speech interests with the
school district’s interests in providing an effective learning environment, but with a presumption
weighing in favor of the school district.
B. Punishing Cyberbullying and the Need for a New Formulation of the Tinker Test
Once simply just a compound term created to give a name to a new form of Internet
abuse, cyberbullying has reached an immense status in the United States. It is no longer a secret
that the Internet allows students to both surreptitiously voice and widely disseminate their
opinions, tastes, and frustrations to and about their peers. It is also increasingly apparent how the
anonymous nature of the Internet can also provide a dangerous veil for students to hide behind as
a means to bully not only each other, but also other members of their secondary school
77

See infra Part III.A.2
See Papandrea, infra note 196.
79
See infra note 164.
80
See Daniel, infra note 89 at 625. See also Student Comment, UPDATES TO MYSPACE AND THE SOCIAL
NETWORKING WORLD, 16 B.U. J. SCI. AND TECH. 14, 18 (2010).
78
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community.81 Similarly, when online abuse is directed toward teachers, it injures students’
ability to learn by hurting teacher credibility and effectiveness in the classroom.82 When
students bully and abuse each other, even in a cyber context, this behavior has the ability to
distract from learning altogether and becomes a detrimental stumbling block in the way of
furthering our nation’s educational system.83
This comment84 promotes endowing schools with the authority to punish vulgar Internet
speech when done off-campus when it meets certain threshold tests, which must be redesigned
and adapted for the present era.85 Part II will give an over-view of the jurisprudence regarding
the right of a secondary school district to discipline student speech and the interaction with the
student’s first Amendment rights. Section III presents a proposed updated analysis86 by first
setting main recommended “guidelines” outlining when school districts should be allowed to

81

See supra note 20.
See Gail Masuchika Boldt, Paula M. Salvio, & Peter M. Taubman, Classroom Life in the Age of Accountability,
Mar. 2009, Available at: http://www.eric.ed.gov/PDFS/ED505851.pdf. The authors describe the harm that comes
from allowing students to post negatively about students, teachers, the school, or the school community as an injury
to prestige and community values and thus teaching often does not receive the credibility as a profession in America
as it does in other countries. Id.
83
See Michael Ollove, Bullying and Teen Suicide: How do we Adjust School Climate?, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE
MONITOR, Apr. 28, 2011, http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Society/2010/0428/Bullying-and-teen-suicide-How-dowe-adjust-school-climate.
84
It should be noted that many of the cases highlighted in this comment seem more about addressing the harm that
occurs when a student has “bullied” a teacher or administrator via the Internet. While this seems to summarize an
aspect of many of the cases that make their way to trial, it is just as promising to assess student speech in the context
of peer bullying because it seems to be the “subset” of most concern. Many times, victims of student-on-student
cyberbullying fail to bring or cannot bring suit against their tormentors, thus explaining the lack of documented case
examples in some instances. Often, when a student commits suicide as the result of cyberbullying, the school
district will have insisted that they could not mete out any punishment prior to the event, such as the case with
Phoebe Prince’s tormentors and the legal system is only resorted to for purposes of criminal charges or a wrongful
death suit. See Kennedy, supra note 12.
85
See supra Section A.
86
Because of the general fear of “prevalence” of works written on the topic of cyberbullying and regulation I intend
to define the contours of my discussion with precision. Frequently, the articles I came across were written at a much
earlier date/before the latest holding on the most recent cases were handed down (on Layshock and J.S.) and thus
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punish this speech. It begins with a proposed modification of the Supreme Court “Tinker Test” 87
for Internet speech cases. Section III further discusses how the test in its current form and the
proposed re-formulation, affect administrative discretion over students’ education.88 Section IV
will consider how the proposed modification to certain “definitional deficiencies” existing in the
Tinker test could also be implicated or rectified through legislation. Section V provides a
discussion of how the Court should rule to redefine the test, should they choose to certify a case.
Finally, Section VI will consider how the concept of the need for a new test interacts with the
recent “bullying” legislation that is being proposed in various forms. It is lastly of great
importance to consider the policy implications surrounding entities which argue for a crackdown
with laws that adopt a “zero tolerance” approach and to consider the federal legislation has been
proposed in various capacities.
The reformulation of the Tinker test will ultimately prove useful because the current
iteration is overly complex89 and does not provide specific definitions for certain key terms in the
balancing test (i.e. material disruption, the schoolhouse gate begins and ends). This causes
confusion for both courts in deciding the cases and school administrators in formulating their
policies. In examining the reformulation of a student-speech monitoring test, the ultimate goal is
to create a rule or law which effectively allows school districts and school officials to punish
cyberbullying, while keeping students’ first amendment rights in tact. At its core, the purpose of
87
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any anti-bullying rule is the creation of an intimidation-free (and arguably more effective)
learning environment. The formulation of the test as detailed in this comment is ultimately
preferable, because it provides the necessary guidance lacking in the current iteration, with
regard to the balancing of interests, materiality of the disruption, and the crucial question of the
boundaries of the schoolhouse gate, as applied in a modern context.90
C. What Exactly Constitutes Cyberbullying?: Definitions and Overview
Bullying is often defined as aggression that is repeatedly targeted toward an individual
who has the inability to easily defend himself, with intentionality requiring some element of
malice.91 Traditionally, the concept of bullying (in general) was student on student and
punishable when done in an off-campus context.92 But the evolution of bullying as a power
mechanism now reaches past the student-on-student context to include students bullying
teachers, their administration, and initiating large scale school-wide threats.93 Thus, in order to
serve the purposes of rules, which can touch off-campus Internet speech thereby surmounting a
First Amendment challenge by a student, one must analyze the “means” of bullying and the
“place” of bullying to a much greater extent. One constant in the variety of existing
cyberbullying definitions, is that the term still remains increasingly difficult to define.94
The most comprehensive definition, to date, comes from a Canadian awareness website,
articulating cyberbullying as “the use of information and communication technologies to support
deliberate, repeated, and hostile behavior by an individual or group that is intended to harm
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others.”95 Because of the breadth of what the internet now contains, cyberbullying can currently
include the degrading speech which occurs through social networking spaces (Facebook,
MySpace, Twitter), emails, text messages, multi-media messages, instant messaging (AIM,
Google Chat, Facebook chat), chat rooms and forum-board postings, and online phone services
(such as Skype and video chat functions).96 The setting for the bullying is therefore key,
however imprecise the definition; cyberbullying takes place in cyberspace, a “decentralized,
global medium of communication which links people, institutions, corporations and governments
around the world.”97
In both Layshock v. Hermitage School District and J.S. v. Blue Mountain School District,
the Third Circuit ruled that derogatory profiles the respective students created about their
principals and subsequently posted on MySpace98 were protected by the First Amendment,
occurring off-campus and thus could not be punished by the school district.99 One of the issues
faced by the court in Layshock was the fact that the student, Justin Layshock had used a school
resource by lifting a photo of his principal off the school website and then coupled it with
content from a survey, with all the “answers…based on the theme of ‘big’ because [the principal
he was insulting] is apparently a large man.”100 The court however, found that Justin’s “entry”
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onto the website was not enough to be considered within the schoolhouse gates for the purposes
of the Tinker analysis.101
The Second Circuit, faced with different facts, however, has (most recently in 2008)
allowed a school to punish vulgar Internet speech by a student, even if the speech occurred
online/off campus.102 In Doninger, a high school student council member posted a comment on
her blog from a home computer, complaining about a school event, which was cancelled “due to
the douche bags in central office,” and encouraging her peers to do the same.103 The school
district received various phone calls, some from upset students who had followed the blogs
directives.104 As a result, the student council member who had written the blog was prohibited
from running for student council in the future.105 In her First Amendment challenge, the Second
Circuit found that the school district had the authority to punish the student and even though the
post was created off-campus, because the post, “foreseeably create[d] the risk of substantial
disruption within the school environment.”106 The result is seemingly incongruous. The Second
Circuit has allowed school officials to punish off-campus student speech and thus afforded it no
protection, even when only based on hypothetical results. The Third Circuit, in contrast, has
refused to punish speech even where, arguably, harm has already occurred.107
Both tests derived their essential reasoning by using the original, and oft-challenged, test
as set down in the Supreme Court in Tinker. As discussed above, while this comment advocates
generally for the reasoning set forth by the 2nd Circuit court in Doninger, it also attempts to
101
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advance a more workable, new “test” which focuses on the context and online forum of the
students’ speech as well as where the speech is directed, driving the reasoning away from any
“tests” that may have been suggested before. This comment also delineates how and when
certain student speech is no longer considered “protected” and how the courts can effectively
surmount the First Amendment challenges that will inevitably arise.
Scholars, student authors, and theorists alike frequently have alleged that a new approach
is needed to the underlying problem either through the courts, legislature, or school districts
themselves.108 But few of these theorists have actually even attempted to articulate what they
feel the new test, law, or school policy should be. One exception to this generality is the view
posited by Thomas Wheeler, the author of an article which appeared in the 2011 winter
publication of the Pace University’s Law Review, which advocated for a “magic bullet theory”
to resolve the cyberbullying punishment issue.109 Wheeler’s test, however, is ultimately
unhelpful, for a variety of reasons. First, Wheeler argues within his article that the moment of
creation of the student speech is irrelevant, and the focus of any new test should be the access,
which can be achieved at school.110 While it may be correct that the speech should be punished
if it is accessed at school, one cannot simply disregard the moment of creation. Creation is
essential and relevant, considering the speech’s eventual on-campus dissemination, in light of the
fact that may school’s today retain sophisticated blocking applications upon their servers.
The heading of this section refers to this minor phenomenon as “the same thing over and
over again,” because it is interesting and perhaps even indicative of the need for the solution in
108
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this realm of the law.111 It seems, at least from a distance, that many scholars are willing to
openly discuss the fact that the United States educational system has a problem in this area -- and
yet no one is willing to propose a more definite solution. Could it perhaps be because theorists
and lawmakers alike are afraid to disrupt the delicate balance and supposedly “time-tested”
interworking of the Tinker test? Or perhaps the fear can be explained through the notion that
reducing the protection surrounding student Internet speech as it relates to school-matters has the
potential to lead to a slippery slope, where censorship abounds and online privacy for students,
teachers and school administrators alike fails to exist. By monitoring Internet activity, are we
not reducing cyberbullying, but actually hindering the creativity and minds of our youth? While
conceivable, each of these concerns can be addressed and the distress conjured can be allayed
through a most careful drafting of a new rule, accompanied by an instructional means of
implication. Yet the hesitance and the Tinker test remains, leading this author to bluntly ask,
what is our legal system afraid of?
D. From Tinker Forward: A Progression and Overview of Cases and Terms
While a progressive overview of the body of case law surrounding the First Amendment
jurisprudence regarding protected student speech has already been engaged in above, a review of
the terminology of cyberbullying, forming the background and support for the proposed
solutions to the problem of off-campus cyberbullying is also instructive. As was previously
mentioned, the court in Tinker first promoted the “material and substantial” disruption test, with
regard to students wearing black armbands to school in protest of the Vietnam War.112 But it is
indeed highly possible that the Supreme Court Justices, who decided Tinker in 1969, could have
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never contemplated the growth and change, altering the landscape of what is defined as student
speech. Subsequently, the Supreme Court determined that the schools were truly instruments of
the state and thus may determine that the essential lessons of “civil, mature conduct cannot be
conveyed in a school that tolerates…offensive speech and conduct.”113 Later, the Third Circuit,
interpreting the holding in Bethel, determined that there is no First Amendment protection for
lewd, vulgar, indecent and plainly offensive speech in school.114
E. Bullying vs. Harassment: The Subtle Differences
Janis Wolak’s famous 2007 study suggested that it is much more accurate to consider
“repeated acts of online aggression as online harassment.”115 Wolak and her research team
initially argued that online harassment was far easier to terminate than face to face bullying, as a
website is much easier to take down, but later added that there are instances where tracking the
bully to a website and then removing the harassment could be extremely difficult.116 In general,
while it might be somewhat early to identify “trends” in this area (as to the character of
cyberbullying as an overarching principal), it is at least reasonable and worth noting that
cyberbullying differs greatly from normal face to face bullying in its ability to reach large
numbers of people. In one notable psychology study, the comparison between cyberbullying and
face-to-face bullying was broken down into the categories of the imbalance of power and the
repetition of the bullying done over time.117 In this case, “scope” means that in the past, bullying
was done face to face and the maximum audience were those who were immediately present or
Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 678 (1986). The court in Fraser distinguished a student’s
high school nomination speech at a school assembly, which included a graphic sexual metaphor as punishable from
the black protest armbands in Tinker. Id. It is possible that this disparity results from the ‘who’ who is promoting
the speech, an adult in one case and a child in the other.
114
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who then would be drawn to the crowd or spread rumors. Although it may seem self-obvious, it
is clear and must be mentioned how cyberbullying and bullying which takes place through an
internet forum has a much broader scope,118 can reach more audiences, and can alter a student or
teacher’s public image within mere moments of its upload. The spreading of the speech then
becomes an even more crucial issue. When students not only “tag,” post, share links, text, or
even in this case as well, share the medium through word of mouth—rapidity gives way to an
immediacy of impact.
F. The “Point” of School Discipline
While performing an overview of the law in this domain, it is important to note the extent
of a school’s ability to discipline its students’ off-campus speech/activity as given a grant of
authority to punish by state law. Further, what is the point of school districts being able to
punish off-campus Internet speech when/if it falls within the proper domain of the law? At its
core, the purpose of disciplining students for cyberbullying within schools is to promote good
citizenship and help foster/create a learning environment with the ability to reach an optimal use
of school resources. By reducing threats and hindrances in the form of distractions, educators
can promote school communities that are allowing the maximum number of students to learn and
grow into the type of “future” leaders and contributors we desire as a population.
III. COLLISION, DE-INDIVIDUALIZATION, DISCRETION AND BALANCING:
WALKING THE TIGHTROPE TO A NEW TEST

The main overarching problem that seems to occur when coping with the cases and legal
incidents surrounding cyberbullying, is how the rules, laws, and judicial standards as set by the
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federal circuits, either align or collide with a student’s first amendment rights.119 This comment
outlines a variety of potential solutions; however they can each be summarized briefly as part of
an overview in context of the trajectory of the overall argument.
First, there is the position that the Court need not scrap the Tinker test entirely, but update
the formula in its next major hearing concerning student Internet speech. This alteration of the
test should conform to the growth, which has occurred via technology, changing the nature of the
speech in general.120 In this reformulation, the balancing test of interests (school district and
student’s) must be updated and certain definitions, which compose the test, must be redefined in
light of the present advances in technology.
In contrast to this judicial remedy, there is a second possible solution, involving school
districts across the nation taking the initiative to train and educate their students on internet
speech and behavior, within the interaction of an anti-bullying program and a fair use policy.121
Proponents of this alternative see such school-district initiatives as pre-emptive strikes on
cyberbullying or student speech. While school administration authored policies are perhaps a
step in the right direction, they also could become problematic by limiting student-speech in such
a way that students refuse to “sign” the codes of conduct they are embodied in, further giving
parents the impetus to sue. A third solution, which may encompass pieces of the pre-emptive
attack, is the use of cyberbullying legislation to solve the problem. A number of states have
adopted these types of laws, which may operate on a district level; however there is yet to be a
federal statute that deals directly with the specific regulation and punishment of cyberbullying.
As a starting proposition, one of the most convincing arguments comes out of Judge Kent
Jordan’s concurrence in Layshock, where the Third Circuit Judge opines, “to the extent it appears
119
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we have undercut the reasoned discretion of administrators to exercise control over the school
environment, we will not have served will those affected by the quality of public education,
which is to say everyone.”122 Jordan goes on to further explain that, although the Third Circuit
has not said that Tinker is inapplicable to off-campus speech simply because it is done offcampus, he has a fear that the court’s decision would send a message, that “anything goes” in
terms of non-punishable internet student speech.123 Proponents of wide discretion for school
districts view this specific piece of Jordan’s concurrence as his expression of (albeit tentative)
support for school administrative efforts to maintain order. Jordan’s support only extends though
when the student speech gets to the point where it becomes, “a potent tool for distraction and
fomenting disruption,” as it arguably did in the case of Layshock.124
In agreement with Judge Jordan’s rationale, it is arguable that the Tinker test should
continue to be used as a means to gain order arising out of a balance in schools with respect to
student free speech.125 While it is not plausible that an approach should be taken which allows
excessive rigidity and school district discretion, effectively reducing each student to just
“Another Brick in the Wall,”126 courts must be mindful of the challenges that school officials
face. Teachers and administrators alike bear the weight of such tasks as promoting a safe
learning environment, being mindful of student welfare, and creating a culture, which is most
conducive to noticeable gains.
A. Rebooting Tinker for the Technological Era
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The Tinker test, which implies a weighing approach,127 exudes timelessness in some
contexts, but truly needs to be re-evaluated for the technological times. This is not to say that the
Supreme Court should endeavor (if and when it decides this issue before the legislation tackles it
first) to completely over-rule the Tinker test. Rather, it should be “updated” and re-evaluated in
the next case the Court chooses to hear, with the ultimate goal being an adaptation to the test’s
parameters in the context of cyberbullying occurring off-campus. Of course there will be
dissident voices to this approach, but the technological world is rarely reinvented without such
outcries of dissent.128
1. Part I: Update to the Balancing Test
First, the “balancing” element of the test should be ultimately kept, but should
specifically include new factors and be restructured as to how the test functions in application.
In matters of application, it is instructive to note how the field of employment law applies its
own First Amendment tests to the similarly situated matters of employee-protected speech within
the workplace. While employment law may seem an unlikely candidate from which to “borrow”
instructive legal applications, casebook author and expert on private ordering within employment

127

Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 510 (1969). The opinion specifically describes how
“[students] may not be confined to the expression of those sentiments that are officially approved. In the absence of
a specific showing of constitutionally valid reasons to regulate their speech, students are entitled to freedom of
expression of their views.” Id.
128
For example, in every instance that Facebook changes its interface/design, there are immediate online outbursts
of negative reactions. While this specific social networking sites is a free form of expression that no one is forced to
use, the analogy illustrates a point. In the past, federal courts relied on the security and expectations of the Tinker
test in deciding bullying litigation on the secondary school level. But this is not to say that if the test were slightly
altered to reflect the evolving world that it would render it useless and “users” i.e.: the courts, schools, and the
public would abandon it altogether in favor of something else. Generation Y users have had Facebook since 2005 or
earlier, just like the courts have had Tinker since 1969. When Facebook changes, we grumble, post our outrage and
clumsily learn the new applications, but within months hardly notice the adjustments to this constant presence in our
lives. While this analogy may be slightly mismatched to the application of judicial test, the point the author is trying
to make is that while there may be a period of adjustment using “Tinker 2.0,” the legal community will adjust and
find no need to completely abandon something just because the interface looks a little different.

24

Timothy Glynn suggests that similarities exist between the to fields regarding issues of
cyberbullying.129
With that in mind, some analogous employment law formulas have been borrowed in the
formation of the proposed test. The balancing test will retain the essential concept of weighing
the school’s interests with the student’s first amendment rights/interests, however, it is apparent
that the factors which must be considered in the weighing process must be redefined and in some
cases added. On the student side, many of the questions (such as factors 1 and 2), really first ask
if the student’s speech was actually bullying (regardless if it was toward a school personnel or a
student) or of a vulgar nature.130 The factors will not line-up evenly within the test, as the
student’s interests have more categories to consider. Accordingly, more weight should be given
to each of the school district factors as a general proposition. The purpose of such weighting, is
to give the school district the presumption of discretion, unless the student makes a substantial
showing and can prove that many of the factors weigh in his/her favor.131
2. The School’s Multi-Factorial Interests
At the outset, it is helpful to consider that the individual schools or the school districts
have several interests that must be considered and served, thus creating a multi-factorial aspect
of the test. With regards to factor one, the original starting point of Tinker, should be kept, with
the fact finder asking “Does the speech cause a substantial, material disruption?” A reoccurring
129
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issue between the federal courts as to what constitutes a “substantial disruption” of the school
environment,132 which factors into the struggle of achieving an appropriate and effective
balancing test. First, it is imperative that (as factor 3 will also show) a school can and should be
able to take action pre-emptively, even before a substantial disruption occurs. School
administers frequently “bear the brunt of setting and enforcing their own cyberbullying rules, a
daunting challenge given the current breadth and depth of student free speech rights.”133 One
main goal of the reformulation should make it clear that this burden is slightly alleviated. If the
school officials, in their best judgment, feel that a disruption could be imminent if the Internet
student speech becomes widely disseminated amongst the student population, they should have
the discretion to discipline the student. Even if it has yet to cross the bounds of the schoolhouse
gate, school officials should be permitted to act.
When examining the material disruption itself, one must first consider what the “nexus”
is between the speech and the school. Is it such that a reasonable person can easily identify a
strong and pervasive connection between the two, so that the school (in general/many facets)
could be seen as having been impacted by the speech?134 In the past, courts have found that
simply because students discuss the speech in class or in school, the underlying Internet content
132
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does not constitute a material disruption.135 Similarly, the disruption must rise beyond merely
upsetting the staff due to the content of the speech to be considered “material”.136 While a
student’s mobile tweet mocking the governor on a school field trip to the capital may be
embarrassing to the school district,137 it is far less disrupting then invidious comments about
race, gender, religion or even personal threats on a teacher. This again presents a difficult
stumbling block, which must be surmounted in the proposal of a new test. If it can be proven
that the cyberbullying speech is upsetting a student or a teacher to the point that the learning
environment is materially impacted, (e.g. the student or teacher is unable to function), would that
justify a legal finding of a material disruption?138 Most likely the answer would be yes, however
this query seems to require more of an examination into the reasonableness of the situation on a
case-by-case basis.
A third question to be asked: Does the speech create a “reasonable apprehension” (in the
best judgment of the school officials, using their experience in education and in their capacity as
the initial authorities who have professional knowledge with which best to judge the event of the
student speech) that a disruption will occur in the learning environment as a result of the
speech?139 More simply put, this standard gives the court leave to assess whether or not the
school administration had a good faith, objective belief that the speech would disrupt the school
environment. This factor has, in the past, been defined as if the student Internet speech could
135
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potentially make its way to the school campus in a “foreseeable” manner. Again, though, there
is a problem of what constitutes “foreseeable” as no court has ever strictly defined the term, only
given examples.
The Western District of Pennsylvania and the Central District of California have each
found that communicating existence or knowledge of the cyberbullying to another student by the
creator off campus, makes it foreseeable that the speech may make its way to the schoolyard and
cause a substantial disruption.140 While common sense notion behind this test for assessing the
chance that the speech may cross the “schoolhouse” gate is reasonable, the term “foreseeability”
should defined in more definite terms. The threshold question then becomes: Do the school
administrators or officials dealing with the speech have a well-founded belief that it will cause a
disruption? This prediction or belief may be influenced by past-experiences school
administrators have seen or have learned through district and state specific professional trainings
that have urged them to target these kinds of behaviors as bullying. In order for the belief to be
“reasonable” the likelihood of a disruption needs to pass a certain threshold: it needs to be not
just possible, but probable that a disruption will occur.
The court in J.S. seemed to promote the idea that student speech could be “so
outrageous” that it was essentially easy to detect that it lacked sincerity.141 This creates a great
matter of perplexity, as it becomes increasingly difficult to determine how one would “know” if
the student was serious or not. For example, the school district might perceive the speech as an
empty threat, a student simply venting his frustrations, or as a vehicle of humor. When Emma
Sullivan made the aforementioned tweet about her state’s governor, she claims the message “was
140
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harmless…[and that it was] not like [she] was really fired up about anything [Governor
Brownback] said.142 Accordingly, “believability” within the test should perhaps be tied to the
credibility of the threat: it does not matter if the threatening behavior is outrageous as long as it
can perhaps be grounded in some fact or is perhaps an action that a student might be reasonably
capable of committing. It is most likely best however, that the school administration err on the
side of caution, as it is apparent from past tragedies143, that students are frequently capable of
even the most destructive events.144
Finally, as part of the fourth element, the fact finder must ask: does the speech cause an
invasion of the rights of others? In summation, the appropriate test is that which was originally
laid down in Tinker, plus a critical analysis of the facts surrounding the speech, might reasonably
lead a school district to foresee material interference with the learning environment.145
3. Contrasting the Students’ Interests
Before even examining the factors to be weighed in the students’ favors, One might ask:
are there other/better formulations of first amendment rights/incorporative tests out there that can
be used to model what should actually be considered in this case? First, one must consider the
nature and character of the speech, meaning the actual topic the speech concerns. The speech
should be particularly flagged as potential cyberbullying if it is critical or disparaging of another
student, a teacher, or the school administration in general. Depending on the nature of the
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criticism, this could rise to the level of a material disruption to the school environment, by
drawing attention to the critique or by inviting other students join the “speech” or “speaker” in
his views. In assessing the speech, it must be clear to the fact finder that a reasonable student of
a similar age (or even a reasonable person of any age) would find the speech insulting. In the
alternative, if it was meant in jest, would an individual of a similar age be able to construe it as a
joke and the intent was not serious? Furthering the inquiry: what is the forum of the speech and
how accessible is it to others? If, for example, speech was created on a Facebook wall, many
students may have access to it just by being in the same “network,” because they attend the same
school. Or is the speech on something akin to a blog, where access can be restricted and only
certain selected (perhaps by the author) students can view? What is the quality of the speech?
Was time spent detailing specific threats or potential future incidents of bullying or was the
speech just a brief outcry against an immediate school occurrence? In addition, to whom was the
speech directed? Is there more of a reason to protect against student-on-student cyberbullying as
opposed to student-on-teacher/administrator? As between a cyberbullied student versus a
teacher, one cannot weigh heavier than the other, in terms of whom the school should provide
more protection, as both could have a substantial impact on the school’s learning environment.
While the focus should, at all times, remain on protecting the students, the court must consider
the teachers and administrators safety as well.
In the second factor, the courts must consider the purpose of the speech. In exploring the
purpose of the speech, evidence that a student-made website was accessed while at school,
through a school server, or that the intended audience was the students of the school, can lead to
the finding that the speech is on-campus in nature.146 If one of the purposes of the student
speech was to have an audience of other students, then it should be within the school’s discretion
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to punish the off-campus speech, as it is clear the student intended to disseminate a view with a
goal of disruption in mind.147
The online publication of the speech on the school grounds may lead to a widespread lack
of respect, diminishing the credibility of the learning environment or incite fear and create worry
by allowing one student to spread a message of hate and intimidation about another student or
teacher. The counter-argument to this will of course be, perhaps that the student was just
attempting to share a joke or a point of view. 148 The purpose and the true intent behind the
speech must be examined within the context of a reasonable person’s interpretation, while at the
same time continuing to be mindful that no threat should be underestimated given the current
state of the educational system and the violence that has occurred in the past.149
Next, the court should inquire whether there a causal connection between the
cyberbullying and Internet speech to other school issues or behavioral problems rendering speech
clearly retaliatory?150 The purpose of the student speech may also be evinced by the student’s
intent in creating the speech. The court needs to determine if the speech was posted as a joke, a
rebellion, or perhaps a protest against the actions of a peer or the school district. Further, the
dissemination as informed by privacy settings and accessibility of the content may also give
clues as to the purpose of the speech. The ability of others to have access to the internet speech
and the likelihood that others will see, along with the general question of who these other
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individuals are (friends, school officials, the community, or anyone in the world), are critical in
answering this question.
Third, one must consider the “voice” of the speech and question from a societal point of
view, whether this is the kind of speech the American public deems worth of protection. For
example, if the student is acting in opposition to a school district practice,151 could the speech be
construed as a form of political expression or an expression of freedom from some type of
oppression? Generally, speech furthering a political expression or an expression of freedom is
one that the First Amendment was specifically designed to protect and is entitled to the ultimate
protection.
Finally, the finder of fact must consider if stifling this student speech is chilling to First
Amendment rights or the essential expressions that fosters the growth of a young mind. This
factor also will assess, in part, the negative further-reaching consequences of allowing the
student speech to exist in its current form. It would be useful, at this point, for the court to
consider the impact of the speech on the community and school moral, or even the credibility of
the educational profession in general. Perhaps this is a factor that is best assessed in terms of the
societal effects of allowing or disallowing the student speech. The goal of many school districts
is to raise and educate good citizens152. Thus, the court should consider the importance of that
goal, without becoming too far attenuated from the issue (the impact of cyberbullying) at hand.
4. Part II: How Should the Court Deal with the Definitional Problem of the
“Schoolhouse Gate”?
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Although it now seems that speech occurring outside the schoolhouse gate is no longer
barred from the arm of school discipline, some of the reasoning used by the Third Circuit in the
recent cases makes it apparent that the location of the speech’s creation is a component that the
court should consider in making its ultimate decision on whether the speech is susceptible to
punishment. The majority in Layshock admitted the fact that it is “now well established that
Tinker’s ‘schoolhouse gate’ is not constructed solely of the bricks and mortar surrounding the
school yard. Nevertheless, the concept of the ‘school yard’ is not without boundaries and the
reach of school authorities is not without limits.”153 The Layshock court particularly expressed
concern of the “unseeingly and dangerous precedent” which could be created by allowing the
state, through the arm of the school, reach into a student’s home and control the child to the same
extent the child could be controlled at school.154 Thus, the Third Circuit adopted the position
that schools could punish the expressive conduct “that occurs outside the school, as if it occurred
inside the ‘schoolhouse gate,’ under certain very limited circumstances,” none of which were
identified in the instant case.155 Given the examples the court cites, the limited circumstances
seem only to be categorized as student Internet speech promoting disruptive conduct or issuing
threats upon specific individuals.156
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Instead, the Supreme Court should update this piece of the test, with the aim of defining
the schoolhouse in more modern terms, perhaps even considering what composes the “virtual
schoolhouse,” moving the boundaries to reflect the modern technological realities that exist.157
For example, in California, a district court decided that speech-forum (where the speech was
created) and who eventually had access to the speech was much more important than the
geographic origin of the speech, meaning the location where the speech became “live” in terms
of social media access.158 Next, it is no longer feasible for courts to aver that student speech
created at an off-campus computer, but later accessed from a school computer is not punishable.
Courts should uniformly recognize that on campus access of off-campus speech creates a
foreseeable risk of a substantial disruption to the school environment159 for two reasons. First,
on campus access creates an immediate potential for distraction, disobedience and negative
response to the speech-target; and second, because the speech and the cyberbullying it
encompasses have crossed the school grounds at the precise moment of access.
Similarly, it seem preposterous that when Justin Layshock went on to the MySpace
webpage he created from a school computer and changed the settings,160 it did not constitute an
action, such as a re-publication, which occurs on-campus and within the schoolhouse gate. This
mandates that the test, in light of the digital age, must now examine when a digital action starts
or begins in time, potentially almost as if one were examining the action under stimulus-response
theory.161 In a stimulus-response setting, the theory of conditioning deems a response followed
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by a reinforcing stimulus is strengthened and more likely to occur again.162 With respect to
emails and texts, there is a distinct time of sending and a time of receipt—when, at that moment
the specific message “hits” the reader and is absorbed by him or her.
MySpace and Facebook,163 on the other hand, are more like the technological equivalent
of living organisms—changing, growing, and having the ability to have its user manipulate it to
respond. The profile, once formed, changes in a manner that does not fit easily in a stop-and-go
schema, unless we isolate each little change, post, tweet, and tag. But even if we do isolate each
minute action, the change to the MySpace profile in Layshock would then fall within the bounds
of Tinker as one little piece of creation occurring within the school grounds. The point of a
social media profile is not its initial creation, it is what the user then does with the profile: how
he or she nurtures it, grows what it contains (photos, comments, posts), and raises it to become a
manifestation of him or herself in an online capacity.
The argument that an opponent of this theory, for example, a student challenging a
disciplinary action levied by his school administration, may raise in objection to this, is that a
back and forth conversation or interaction of wall/blog posts may create individual catalysts for
action, abuse and bullying. Thus, Twitter, AOL instant messaging, GChat, Facebook Chat, and
messenger programs may fall more in the “middle” of this analysis and the balancing of interests.
In other words, each post, re-post and response may be an action having an ending point in time
and space, but this might complicate the analysis. After all, an online conversation, although
done through wireless channels, is a dialogue none-the-less. These dialogues can last for days,

1999). Typically learning is described as a stimulus and response relationship, with the classical expression of this
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months or even years, fostering the environment where some claim to form online
“relationships” and even develop online personas.
Isolation in this particular manner, however, does not seem necessarily feasible or
realistic when social networking is considered in a realistic context. Friends frequently urge
each other to become parts of social network164 and upon choosing to submit, an individual
creates a profile, which they then grow and raise from its online inception or birth. The point of
any social medium is to stay connected, update, change, disclose, give TMI,165 and the like as
one’s interests change and tastes evolve. The online “self” is then projected and permitted to
connect with others as a means of keeping up to date and networking.166 It is possible to isolate
every small change, but one must question if it makes sense in the context of the whole online
identity and the over-arching purpose of social networking on a general level. The purpose of
social networking is to have an ongoing, relevant, living representation of oneself “out there” in
the cyber sphere that changes as “you” the individual changes. This broadly phrased concept is
something that can be understood by nearly all, especially students who reside in the peer
pressured, highly image-driven world of secondary education.
The Court should also consider the causal connection between the time and space of the
activity and the school district or student regardless of the “physical space” where the bullying
occurs. The court might have its analysis informed by a litany of factors, which may have
164
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recently occurred, for example: did anything happen between the school and the student such as
punishment, or a prior disciplinary event?167 What were the student’s actions the date of the
creation? The court should take into account whether or not the speech’s purpose was in fact to
retaliatory, regardless of whether or not it was against another student, teacher, or the school
itself. If the purpose was retaliatory, or can be inferred as retaliatory, this clearly implicates a
situation where the school district should be afforded the chance to monitor the student’s
behavior. By allowing a student to lash out at a peer or the school district through an off-campus
Internet forum without the fear of punishment, the school in a sense concedes that it will permit
students to potentially disrupt the school environment without the fear of punishment. Before
long, the students, who may have been using the Internet forum as a means of expressing a form
of 1st Amendment protected “political” speech, will simply be allowed to claim and misapply
the shelter of this provision, even when the speech serves no legitimate political function or is
merely a piece of vulgar, violent, or threatening speech hidden within the guise of a “political”
message.
It is important within this categorical analysis to also consider if there was any change to
the online content of the speech over time. If the student changed the online content/post/tweet
after the dissemination (such as making it private or limiting the audience168), the court would
need to assess how many students may or may not have already seen the content. For instance, if
the student “self-limited” the speech or stopped its spread for fear of punishment, one could
argue that this already shows that the environment was affected.169 Further, an altogether
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removal, although not dispositive of the student exhibiting remorse, could potentially have the
evidentiary significance that the fear of punishment coupled with the post “getting out of hand”
weighs heavily in the favor of the environment being affected by the speech. Finally, it should
be considered when (in time), if at all, the school forces the student to take down the Internet
speech, as the removal itself might be considered an event. When Justin Layshock was unable to
remove the fake profile, he simply left it available to be viewed on MySpace.170 Justin’s further
act, even though beginning as an attempt to correct a wrong, is an act which not only shows a
wanton disregard of the commotion he had already caused, but could arguably be seen as an
event of “speech” itself. Wanton speech left-posted, adding to a school disruption and done from
a computer lab computer,171 should be punishable.
In the final outcome of Layshock, the court of appeals decided that schools can punish
student speech which rises to the level of cyberbullying and which is outside the schoolhouse
gate in a limited context.172 While the court specifically uses the phrasing, “certain very limited
circumstances,”173 it offers no further definition. In order for the Court to provide more guidance
to the application of this terminology, these “circumstances” must be explored as part of this test
and examples should be provided. Guidance for this piece of the test’s inquiry will be supplied
by the considering whether or not the lewd or offensive speech was meant to be a “parody,”174
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however it should be noted that even a parody, 175 if significantly vulgar or seemingly
threatening, may be grounds for justified discipline.176
Next, another consideration for the “context” of when speech can be punished or not may
be able to arise from an examination of the student’s first amendment rights, specifically, the
protections contained within rights themselves.177 One point which needs to be emphasized, is
that although this proposed test mandates the balancing of student interests against those of the
school district when it comes to online speech, one should remember that the goal of any school
district is ultimately to protect its students in such a way that encourages the most positive
learning environment. Further, school districts should also be viewed as guardians of privacy, in
that they have the ability to protect students from bullying and the choices that students may
make in response to bullying, especially if the student is a member of what is considered a
minority group (legally or within the school district itself). The finder of fact should then,
instead, construe the school’s ability and discretion to punish as properly interacting with and
ultimately safeguarding student rights, not diminishing them.
For example, in a district court case from Wisconsin, an openly gay student was deemed
to have a right (grounded in her First Amendment free speech rights) to wear a pro-LGBT shirt
to school without fear of the school district punishing her and thereby informing her parents of
her sexual preference.178 While the court did in fact conduct a type of balancing in the Nguan
A generally accepted legal definition for parody is “a reproduction or representation of a literary or dramatic
work in structure with changes in the names of characters, also in the situations represented, usually for the sake of
comedy.” 18 Am J2d Copyr § 105. Generally, the reproduction contains changes intended to create humor.
BALLENTINE’S LAW DICTIONARY, 3d Ed. (2010).
176
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public display of affection with her girlfriend).
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case,179 it should be seen as an example of how even though a district might ultimately not have
the ability to punish a student, the overall goal is protecting certain vulnerabilities from harm in
the most efficient and beneficial way possible.
5. Confronting Problems with Practical Solutions
The proposed solution, while requesting change, should not be construed as if it is urging
the Court to overrule Tinker. The Tinker test, as it exists, is a time-tested means of balancing
interests, and serves as the basis for the proposed new formulation. The words and
recommendations advocated for herein are simply cautious recommendations and updates and it
must be clear that this comment is not advocating for the court to necessarily overrule the test.180
Recently, two federal courts have held that a school cannot intervene based on every
student’s right to a free public education (with the thought being that punishment for off-campus
speech deprives students of this right), unless the cyberbullying is truly violent or threatening in
nature.181 Although in these cases, the court in its reasoning found that a substantial disruption
could be found if the cyberbullying speech was part of a larger pattern of behavior overtime,182
this reasoning and the resultant ruling are insufficient in justifying punishment and insufficient to
protect students from the mental and psychological strain cyberbullying causes. If one adheres
to the this line of reasoning, essentially the law is saying that the cyberbullying must be violent
in nature or reoccurring frequently before the school will step in. Although this predictive
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construction of the law—as the speech first breaching a threshold of violence before deemed
punishable—is a more extreme result, it should not be overlooked as a potential outcome. Given
the widespread use of internet media as a means of student communication and cyberbullying—
it is no longer feasible to adopt a policy of “wait and see,” when “wait and see” has too often
turned into “too little too late.” It is to late for Jamey, Phoebe, Ryan, and Alexis, but their fate
need not befall the countless other would-be victims: sitting behind computer screens and
contemplating ending their lives because of cyber-torment which school districts are not willing
or able to end.
The Court will undoubtedly weigh the speech in favor of a substantial disruption if the
speech has the ability to pull a school administrator away from his or her normal duties to
address the speech.183 Due to the growing reports of students affected and harmed by
cyberbullying, the stakes are heightened and a school should not have to wait until the online
speech crosses the aforementioned threshold.184 For example, speech has also been found to be a
substantial disruption if it causes the absences of a targeted teacher.185 Although it would be
difficult to determine if the speech causes the absence of a student, as an overarching
consideration, any speech that is threatening or violent should be considered a substantial
disruption, as it has the power to disturb not only the target student, but those around him once
the bully’s cyber-speech inflicts the student past a certain extreme. Too many students and their
respective educations have been negatively impacted, learning environments destroyed, and
young lives lost to wait until the speech crosses the threshold into the realm of “punishable.”
IV. IN THE ALTERNATIVE: SOLUTIONS RELYING IN INTERNAL POLICY AND
LEGISLATION
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A. Educate, Train, Repeat
While an update to the Tinker speech test is needed, a potential alternative course of
action is to train and educate students on the many facets of bullying, with a special focus on
cyberbullying. Instead of merely setting up a regulatory scheme of punishment that can be
meted out at the school district’s discretion, education may instead take the form of policies in a
student handbook, a factor that also might be considered in balancing the interests. The school
however, will still need guidance as to the substance of handbook policy language and whether
ultimately policies should regulate only on-campus speech. Adding this element would establish
a clearly defined “when” and “where.” Applied pre-emptively, this could stop many of the
common type occurrences of cyberbullying.
By giving specific examples after articulating a comprehensive normative standard (so as
not to be facially unconstitutional for vagueness)186 a school district has the ability to take a
preventative standpoint rather than one that is purely reactionary to student behavior. By being
reactionary instead of preventative, the school district is arguably allocating more power to the
student unnecessarily, and allowing them to have a say as to what controls behavior instead of
the school administrators.
The school district must also consider the method(s) of implication of a preventative
policy. Some school officials feel that a school district should begin indoctrinating its students
about the issues of anti-cyberbullying at the youngest age possible.187 Individual instructor and
administrator trainings should first focus on aiding the faculty in identifying both cyberbullying
and student-best-practices, with a district wide implementation program closely following. In
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such a district-wide program, students collaboratively (on a small scale in their classrooms) and
collectively (through school-wide programs and assemblies) learn what constitutes the school’s
adopted anti-bullying policies, which are then widely disseminated amongst a school population
and easily understood.188 Educators and parents alike fear, however, that U.S. schools are
already past the point of no return. A pre-emptive strike against a cyberbullying problem that
has already reached monumental destructive capacity may be too little too late.189 While it is not
foolish to hope that policies adopted for a new generation of students will have the desired
impact of reducing cyberbullying, another way to cope with the growing confusion on the laws
application is for lawmakers to specifically issue mandates as to the scope of the school district’s
discretion in punishing the behavior at issue.
B. Leave it to the Lawmakers
A more viable solution would be the adoption of specific legislation, whether state or
federal, to address the growing concerns surrounding cyberbullying and detail the discretionary
powers of discipline school districts can have. This grant of authority would then define the
limits of what can be punished and would need to surmount generalities and get to the core of the
problem as well: can student speech be punished when it is done off campus, and in what
circumstances can it be punished? One problem with this solution is that even if laws are
adopted similar to those that have been seen in other states, this does not necessarily conclude
the issue surrounding the jurisprudence. The court’s standard defining what speech can be
punished has the potential to remain vague, as students may attempt to still bring claims that the
school district, while conducting itself within the bounds of the new law, did not accord with the
principles set forth in the case law regarding student First Amendment rights.
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C. Best Practices
Out of all the solutions proposed above, the seemingly most plausible explanation is the
solution that addresses the problem in the best way is a combination of a new court decision to
be put on the books and in the meantime, state and local laws be promulgated that aid school
officials in implementing anti-cyberbullying programs. While of course it is always interesting
to note the opposing views that have already been proposed, one must distinguish this solution
from some which promote ideas that are essentially disturbing and antiquated.
Several existing scholarly works or supposed research studies seem to suggest that
student internet speech could actually be a self-regulating mechanism190 and that it is natural for
students to want to “vent” at each other, with the internet and social networking providing the
perfect forum to do so.191 Perhaps the notion behind this disastrous suggestion is correct—and
society wants to believe that the younger generations will learn from their mistakes and be able
to evolve into mature members of their respective communities. But the reality is that secondary
students’ involvement with the cyberbullying, which is consistently in the public eye, has
reached proportions of severity (if not in numbers) that no longer can go unchecked or selfchecked. The over-optimistic outlook that kids will simply vent and have the awareness of when
speech crosses into dangerous territory is outmoded by the maliciousness, undergirding the
reality of many student online interactions.
V. PRACTICALITY AND PREDICTIONS
A. Problem and Answer: The Usefulness of the Reformulated Test to Practitioners
It is, of course, necessary to address any questions that the proposed solution of an update
to the Tinker test might leave. One of the most foreseeable questions that will be raised by such
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a proposed update to the Tinker test is the notion of constant technological advances and
changes--consumers often joke about how one cannot even remove certain technology products
from the retail shelf without the immediate threat of being obsolete. However, this matter is of
course far more serious and drafters must consider the solidification and implementation of a
policy that is applicable to such rapidly changing technology. Any new judicial test, law, or
school district policy must be able to compete with the growth of social media. The classic
example to this is the constant “updates” and changes to Facebook192: those evaluating and
making such policies must be willing to re-evaluate frequently and students must be willing to
adapt.
While Facebook users might half-heartedly complain about the change in how status
updates are projected or the consistent changes to their privacy settings, other conniving students
might see this as a loophole to evade a school policy that may be based on a proposed test. A
clever manipulation of how the actual cyberbullying is accomplished may be just the way (or
perhaps a quick way) to get around a carefully crafted test—bringing society right back to where
it began.
The counter to this, however, is that once the broad new re-envisioning of the Tinker test
is put in place (in the form of a law or perhaps judicial test), it will allow school administrations
much more discretion (within reason) as to how they will administer the law in their own
districts. This does not mean giving carte blanche to punish, but this allows the school board or
central office the capacity to create any provisions within their own cyberbullying policies that
will allow for the facilitation of the national or state law. It should also be noted that this would
perhaps be the best way and the best circumstances to administer “student pre-emptive/teaching”
of the policies—as school districts comply and make updates or changes to their existing
192
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policies, keep students and parents informed by having mandatory sessions where students must
learn and become familiar with the updated policies and sign a code of conduct or letter of
understanding that the policies were introduced and explicated for them.193
Another potential outcome/threat to this structure may be the nagging insistence of
certain critics that parents have the duty, means, and ultimately right, as conferred by the
Fourteenth Amendment, to raise their children194 and reasonably included in the concept of child
rearing is the monitoring of student online activity. This argument however overlooks the fact
that while parents may be in the best position to individually monitor their child’s respective
activity; the school district is ultimately in a better position to monitor and control inter-student
online behaviors.
If this issue does in fact get granted certification in the context of another case, it will be
helpful to predict how the justices of the Robert’s Supreme Court may rule on the issue, based on
past rulings and political inclinations and leanings. Specifically, it will be interesting to note a
possible prediction based on Justice Samuel Alito’s concurrence in Morse in which he opined,
“that this is the far reaches of what student speech permits.”195 Some theorists and scholars have
said that this quote proves that Alito favors more protectionist measures for student speech and
he would most likely favor a provision which restricts the discretion of school districts in
punishing speech, leaning more toward support of the students.196
Lastly, there are a few other pieces of the puzzle that may be interesting to consider in an
attempt to formulate the most cohesive solution possible. There is also the continuing notion that
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some scholars note that the cases most frequently cited deal with student on adult violence and
not student on student, which was the case in both Layshock and J.S.197 Finally, there is the
possibility in some cases that criminal punishment can be meted out in response to
cyberbullying, however this is rare and normally the bullying must rise to the level of
harassment.
VI. CONCLUSION: MODEL BEHAVIOR, CELEBRITY STATUS, AND THE TENTATIVE
NEW HOPE
The Tinker test, while still functional in some contexts, is in desperate need of a
renovation. One need only look to the number of students who still affirm they feel bullied
online by others in their school community to recognize that Tinker is no longer workable.198
The exigency of the situation is thus determinative upon the fact that cyberbullying is not going
away, its not being quelled, and if continued to be left unchecked, the horrifying results that
happened to Ryan Halligan, Phoebe Prince, Alexis Pilkington, and Jamey Rodeymeyer will
become even more prolific.
While this comment ultimately argues for school districts to have the ability to punish
off-campus cyberbullying speech, it is not an avocation for the intrusion upon all student-speech.
Students must be allowed to express themselves in a healthy way, even if it is the controversial
proclamation of a sexual preference, idea, or belief. It is the peer reaction of death threats,
wishes, and violence, which must be ended. It is imperative that if American parents, students,
administrators, and every citizen alike do not want to live in a society that construes loss of a
young life through internet-induced peer cruelty, the law, in some capacity must step-up and lay
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down a concrete law or test, or, perhaps more efficiently, redefines the loose terms of the
existing test once and for all.199 It was too late for Ryan, Phoebe, Alexis and Jamey. But its not
too late other would-be victims of cyberbullying, who, though cowering behind their computer
screens, still might be persuaded to step back from the ledge.
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